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Abstract
Pryor, A ndrew W., M.A. July 2005

Econom ics

Em pirical Analysis o f an Augm ented Becker M odel o f Criminal Behavior (81 pp.)
Chairm an: Dr. John W icks
This thesis em pirically tests m odels to identify crim inal determinates. The approach is
a first step in the quantitative evaluation o f strategies designed to eliminate or reduce the
societal loss associated with crime. Two established m odels explaining behavior are
tested. The results o f these m odels are compared to a m odel developed and tested in this
thesis. This model contains both economic and social psychological variables and is
term ed the augm ented Becker model.
The individual level o f the data collected on the unique crime o f copyright infringement
m akes it possible to test all three m odels; economic theory provides the logical
framework. The theory is based upon the idea that a crim inal considers the benefits and
costs o f the crime. Traditionally, changing the size o f the penalty and the probability o f
its im position w ould change the amount o f crim e by changing the individual's
benefit/cost structure. The use o f individual level data allows inclusion o f respondents’
attitudes about music theft and their perception o f what others think as variables. W hile
these variables are borrow ed from social psychology, they are evaluated in the same
benefit/cost structure as the economic variables.
Statistical tests reveal that the
augm ented Becker m odel explains music theft better than the other approaches.
The statistical results indicate that chance o f getting caught, changing people’s
attitudes, societal influences, and age are significant in explaining the probability o f
m usic theft. This suggests that marketing efforts to change these variables could be
com pared w ith policies increasing enforcem ent to better determ ine the best course o f
action. Identifying the cost associated w ith the m anipulation o f significant variables in
the augm ented Becker m odel is a subject for further study.
Focusing on music theft m akes it possible to identify the individual characteristics o f
those acting in a legal/illegal manner. These individual characteristics, evaluated within
the fram ework o f the econom ics o f crime, are important determ inates o f theft. Their
addition to the model has the potential to enhance available options in the developm ent o f
policies reducing the broader problem o f crim inal behavior.
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Chapter 1
OVERVIEW OF STUDY
Crim e is an im portant economic topic. An em pirical estim ate o f the yearly cost o f
crime concluded that the toll is $4,100 on each Am erican or $1.7 trillion for the entire
econom y (Anderson, 1999).

The fact that crim e places a large burden on the econom y

provides one rationale for its econom ic study. In addition to this, econom ics is the study o f
choice; one aspect o f crim e includes the choice to engage in it.

Due to the large am ount o f

societal loss and the strength o f econom ic theory in explaining individual choices, economics
provides a logical fram ework for evaluating crim inal behavior.
This thesis is prim arily concerned with the evaluation o f the choice to engage in a
criminal behavior. U nderstanding w hy individuals choose to engage in crim inal behavior is
elemental to developing strategies aim ed at reducing the dam age the behavior causes.
Economic theory, as proposed by Gary Becker, a U niversity o f Chicago econom ist and
Nobel laureate, provides the foundation for the empirical analysis presented in this thesis.
B ecker’s m odel explains how rational individuals, evaluating w hether or not to engage in a
criminal act, weigh the expected chance o f getting caught and the cost o f the expected
penalty against the expected gains from the act.

The standard economic decision rule

applies: if benefits outw eigh costs the behavior is undertaken.

From its behavioral

underpinnings, the m odel explains how policy m akers can influence the crime rate by
changing the probability an individual gets caught (e.g., increased expenditures on police) or

1
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by changing the penalty (e.g., increased fines, prison terms, etc.). The m odel provides for the
useful evaluation o f policy alternatives.
W hile the quantitative nature o f econom ics is helpful in assessing optim al policies,
economics does not hold a m onopoly on the academ ic study o f choice and is by no m eans the
dom inant discipline for the study o f criminal behavior.

Because o f this, the analysis o f

choice presented here is based upon an econom ic fram ework but also relies on literature and
research from diverse fields.
A cadem ic disciplines contributing to this analysis include the fields o f social
psychology, m arketing, sociology, and criminology. A particular emphasis is placed upon
theoretical and empirical w ork from the field o f social psychology.

Research within this

field led to the developm ent o f behavioral models. Am ong the preem inent m odels is M artin
Fishbien and Icek A jzen’s Theory o f Reasoned Action.
behavior is related to attitudes and pressure from peers.

This theory explains how overt
Basically, someone who feels

positively about an activity and who has strong social m otivation toward it will participate in
the activity. The Theory o f Reasoned Action is not specific to crim inal behavior; however, it
possesses usefulness in explaining this type o f behavior.

For exam ple, it is likely that a

person evaluating w hether or not to participate in a crim e w ould base this decision, in part,
on what those important to her (e.g. friends, family, co-workers, etc.) think about the crim inal
behavior. Com pelling evidence exists that behavior is unm istakably altered sim ply by the
imm ediate or anticipated presence o f others (M ilgram , 1965), thus other people play a large
role in determ ining individuals’ behaviors.

This exam ple shows how variables from the

Theory o f Reasoned Action might be important determ inates o f criminal behavior and
dem onstrates one reason for the inclusion o f diverse disciplines in this thesis.
2
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Econom ie theory provides the foundation for the em pirical w ork presented in this
thesis. M ore specifically, the crim inal decision is evaluated w ithin the fram ework o f utility
m axim ization. According to this framework, individuals m aking the decision to steal have
weighed all o f the expected costs and benefits, and expect the benefits to be greater. The
traditional econom ic approach described above identifies two m ajor variables that affect
expected utility. They are the chance o f getting caught and the penalty. This thesis theorizes
and em pirically tests the idea that the variables identified in the Theory o f Reasoned Action attitudes and social influences - also affect the expected utility o f engaging in a criminal
behavior. It is hypothesized that the B ecker variables im pose real expected costs (e.g. fine,
imprisonm ent, death, etc.), while the variables from the Theory o f Reasoned Action impose
“psychic” costs (e.g. guilt, shame, spurn, etc.).

The possible advantage to this approach,

termed the augmented Becker m odel, is the w ider range o f options available to those
interested in reducing crime. For exam ple, m arketing efforts designed to change attitudes
might prove a m ore cost effective strategy to reducing crim e than increasing the penalty.
W hile this theory holds prom ise for expanding the econom ic explanation o f criminal
behavior, it cannot be tested as suggested by Becker. That is, aggregate level data cannot be
used. Because there are no aggregate m easures o f attitudes and peer pressure; data for these
variables m ust be collected individually.
behavior presents som e problem s.

Collecting individual level data on criminal

It is important to select a criminal behavior that is

widespread and that people feel com fortable discussing. This helps to ensure accuracy and a
large sam ple size. M usic theft provided an ideal crime for survey data. The reasons for this
include the fact that 25 percent o f Am ericans ages 12 and older currently own a PC-based
Com pact Disc Recorder/Burner. Further, 12 percent reported they have copied a pre-recorded
3
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m usic CD owned by som eone else rather than actually purchasing that particular CD (Ispos,
2003). A 2003 estim ate showed that m usic-sw apping services now attract 40 m illion users in
the United States alone (Ispos, 2003). Due to the proliferation o f com puter users and their
access to the technology enabling theft, illegal m usic acquisition w as the crime chosen in
which to collect data on.
Logistical regression provides the basis for the analysis o f this thesis. This is due to
the effectiveness o f the logistical regression in analyzing m odels w ith binary dependent
variables (e.g. legal/illegal behavior).

In this case, the logit explains how independent

variables affect the probability o f illegal behavior. Separate regressions are run to test three
models o f behavior. The m odels are the econom ic m odel proposed by Becker, the Theory o f
Reasoned Action and the augm ented Becker. Each m odel contains two or m ore significant
independent variables and fit the data reasonably well. These results suggest that each model
could fit the data reasonably be used to explain music theft.

Closer inspection, however,

reveals the augm ented Becker outperform s the other models. The logistical regression run on
the augmented Becker m odel provides evidence that chance o f getting caught, attitudes,
societal influences and age o f the respondent are all significant in explaining m usic theft.'
The significance o f the augmented Becker m odel allows for quantitative evaluation o f
policy options that are not possible using the traditional econom ic approach. Im plem entation
o f policy suggested by the augm ented Becker m odel could prove m ore cost effective. For
example, the results o f the Becker model presented here suggest that chance o f getting caught
affects the probability that one will engage in m usic theft.

Increasing enforcem ent o f the

laws m ight increase the chance o f getting caught and thus decrease the probability o f theft.
' The variable names are Caught, Attitude, Norms (peer pressure) and Age. Norms represent a proxy for
subjective norms as described in the literature chapter.
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M ore enforcem ent requires m ore resources; however this m ay not be the best use o f these
resources. The augm ented Becker m odel suggests that the probability o f crim e can also be
decreased by changing people’s attitudes and societal influences.

M arketing efforts to

change these variables m ight be m ore cost effective than increasing enforcement.

This

exam ple illustrates how the augm ented Becker m odel provides m ore options for the
im plem entation o f potentially effective strategies aim ed at reducing the broader problem o f
theft and the losses associated w ith it.
The results o f this thesis provide a first step in quantifying policy alternatives related
to theft. Identifying the cost associated with the m anipulation o f significant variables in the
augmented Becker m odel is a subject for ftirther study. Other topics for further study include
testing the augmented Becker m odel on other crim inal behaviors and testing w hether current
attempts to change attitudes and societal influences affect the probability o f criminal
behavior.

Assum ing results o f future studies o f crim inal behavior are consistent w ith the

results presented here, the additional variables o f the augmented B ecker model are likely to
produce policies that are im prove the cost effectiveness o f preventing losses associated w ith
criminal behaviors.
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Chapter 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Criminal behavior is widespread, diverse and costly to society. Because o f this, all o f
the social sciences contain at least some literature explaining and analyzing crim inal
behavior. The wide range o f literature is likely due to the fact that crim e touches everyone; a
better understanding o f crim e m ight result its reduction. W hile scholarly works from diverse
social sciences were consulted in the developm ent o f this thesis, the theory proposed in
Chapter 3 relies heavily upon the contributions o f econom ics and social psychology.
chapter presents crim inal behavior w ithin the context o f each discipline.

This

Econom ics is

covered in section 2.1 and social psychology is discussed in section 2.2.

2.1 Economic Perspective
This section presents the econom ic perspective o f theft behavior.

First,

subsection 2.1.1 describes the economic fram ework o f crime. This discussion includes
the distributional effects and the efficiency losses associated with theft.

Second,

subsection 2.1.2 sum m arizes the econom ic theory developed by Gary S. Becker.

The

theory explains theft behavior in econom ic terms, w ith an emphasis on m inim izing the
efficiency loss associated with theft.

Subsections 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.5 exam ine the

em pirical work based upon Becker’s theory.

Lastly, subsection 2.1.6 discuses some

criticism s o f the Becker approach to crime.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2.1.1 The Distributional and Efficiency Effects of Theft
W ithin the theoretical fram ework o f econom ics crim e can have two effects,
transferring or redistributing wealth and decreasing efficiency.^

These effects are best

explained w ith an analogy. Consider an econom y to be like a giant pie. Transfers and
redistributions change w ho gets what piece; efficiency determ ines the size o f the pie.
W hile som e crim es redistribute wealth, m ost crim es reduce efficiency. Thus, crim inal
behavior results in a sm aller pie. This problem is the focus o f econom ic theory regarding
crime.
Efficiency losses occur w hen m arket forces do not reflect the entire benefits or
costs associated w ith a transaction.

In the case o f theft this occurs in four situations.

They are: (1) opportunity cost o f the labor o f thieves, (2) loss o f time and m oney by
potential victim s and the state in deterrence, (3) destruction o f the product or property in
the act and (4) re-direction o f production into activities that cannot be stolen (Usher,
1987, p.236). Each o f these situations does not occur w ith every theft; however, each has
important im plications w ithin the fram ework o f the econom ic m odel o f crim e presented
in subsection 2.1.2.
Efficiency losses furnish a quantifiable m eans o f evaluating criminal behavior,
which leads to the perception that econom ics overlooks the personal physical and
emotional consequences o f crim inal behaviors such as violence, suffering and a loss o f
personal safety.

The ideal reduction o f efficiency losses associated w ith crim inal

behaviors includes these factors.

Thus, through the study o f efficiency, it is possible to

reduce problem s not generally associated w ith econom ics. The economic study o f crime
* The market generates “efficient” allocation o f resources if there does not exist an alternative feasible
resource allocation that can make some individual better o ff without making someone else worse off.

7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

provides a fram ework for the reduction o f all efficiency losses. The desired result o f such
studies is an increase in the size o f the pie.

2.1.2 Economic Theory: Becker
The question o f how to m inim ize the efficiency loss due to theft was first taken up
in Gary S. B ecker’s 1968 work Crime and Punishment: An Econom ic Approach. This
m odel “form ulates a m easure o f the social loss from offenses and finds those
expenditures o f resources and punishm ents that m inim ize this loss” (p. 170). The model
suggests that policy m akers can m inim ize social loss through the m anipulation o f two
variables; offender cost and probability o f conviction per offence.
B ecker posited that the efficiency losses attributable to crime could be m inim ized
through the use o f incentives and punishm ents. To help explain how theft works in an
economic system Becker developed a set o f behavioral equations explaining crime and its
related costs.

The equations explain: (1) net damage to society; (2) the cost o f

apprehension and conviction; (3) the supply o f offences; (4) and punishment. These
equations form (5) the optim ality conditions needed to m inim ize societal loss.
1. Dam age
Becker believed that crim e caused dam age to society related to the num ber o f
offences (O) in the follow ing functional form.
D (0 ) = H (0 ) - 0 ( 0 )

(2.1)

W here,
D

= dam ages f(0 )

H

= harm to the victim f(0 )

G

= gains to the crim inal f(0 )
8
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This form ula is intended to capture all costs and benefits associated with the
crim inal act. In this model dam ages include not only pecuniary costs but psychic costs as
well. A n exam ple o f a psychic cost is the loss o f safety a person feels after being a victim
o f a crime The fact that these costs are included in the model suggests that many studies
whose results are based upon the m onetary cost o f crime underestim ate the actual cost.
2. The Cost o f Apprehension and Conviction
The cost o f apprehension and conviction is expressed by the production function
A (Activity)=f(m ,r,c), i.e. m anpower, materials, and capital used in capturing criminals.
The total cost is expressed as:
C=C(A)

(2.2)

For a better empirical m easure o f “activity” B ecker assum ed that (p) the ratio o f the
probability a person gets convicted to all offences m ultiplied by the num ber o f offences
approxim ated the output o f police and courts. This function is:
A~pO

(2.3)

Becker substitutes equation 2.3 into equation 2.2 differentiates and gets:

Cp =

= C 'o > 0

(2.4)

and
C q = C'p > 0

(2.5)

These equations explain how, as long as probability o f offence (p (0 )) is greater than zero,
the increase in the probability o f conviction or num ber o f offences increases the total cost
to society o f the crime.
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3. Supply o f offences
Econom ic theory explains that a rational person w ill engage in the action w ith the
highest expected utility. This is known as utility m axim ization. For a person operating
w ithin the fram ework o f utility m axim ization, legal behavior should not be taken for
granted. Theoretically, utility optim izers w ill choose to engage in an action that they feel
best suits them regardless o f the legality o f the action. Thus, if a person com m its an act
o f theft it is presum ed that she does so because her expected utility, or reward, from the
act outweighs the alternatives.

This assum ption, that crime represents a possible optimal

allocation o f a person’s resources, allowed Becker to develop a function that explains
w hy people steal. It follows the form:

0=0(p,f,u)

(2.6)

W here,
O

= the num ber o f offences a person com m its in a specific time period

p

= the probability o f conviction per offence

f

= the individual’s punishm ent per offence

u

= a portm anteau variable representing “all other influences”^

In this model only a convicted person pays. Raising the probability o f conviction
or increasing the punishm ent per offence decreases the num ber o f offences carried out
per period. This is explained by the following partial derivatives;
Op= dO ldp < 0

(2.7)

Of=ôO/af<0

(2.8)

and

^ Becker suggests education or a rise in the income available in legal activities as possible “u” variables.

10
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An increase in either p or f w ould reduce the num ber o f offences because either the
“price” w ould be higher or the probability o f “paying” the higher “price” would be
greater. This works by changing the individual’s expected utility function. The utility is:
E U =pU (Y -f)+(l-p)U (Y )

(2.9)

W here,
Y

= incom e, m onetary and psychic from an offence

U

= the individual’s utility function

f

= the m onetary equivalent o f the punishment^

This function shows how increases in p and f result in a decrease in expected utility. It
also shows how a change in the probability o f punishm ent and a change in penalty that
result in equal expected incom e do not have the sam e effect on the individual. Because
the change in the probability has a greater effect on the expected utility o f the individual,
a change in this variable will theoretically cause a greater reduction in crime.
These equations show how individuals choose to “supply” criminal behavior. The
equations follow the econom ists’ analysis o f choice in describing how a person comm its
an offence. The proposition is that people decide to becom e crim inals because their costs
and benefits differ; they expect crim e to pay.
4. Punishm ent
Punishments cost both the th ie f and society. The only direct m onetary m easure o f
punishm ents is fines. In this case, the cost o f adm inistration is subtracted from the fine
resulting in the net societal cost o f the punishm ent. It is apparent that fines can have net
social benefits, how ever m any punishm ents cost society.

For example, im prisonm ent

The effects o f punishment are discussed further in part 4 o f this subsection.

11
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costs society directly through expenditures on prisons. It indirectly costs society through
the forgone earnings o f the crim inal and the loss o f the value placed upon restrictions in
consum ption and freedom o f the convicted. The total social cost o f the punishm ents is
described by:
f '- b f

(2.10)

W here,
f

= social cost

f

= cost to offender

b

= the coefficient that transform s f to f '

Becker believes that the coefficient b that transform s f into f ' varies greatly for different
kinds o f punishm ents. He believes that b=0 for fines, while b > l for torture, probation,
parole, im prisonm ent, and m ost other punishments.
5. Optim ality Conditions
W ith the behavior equations in place Becker was able to answer the question o f
how m any resources to expend to m inim ize the efficiency

loss associated w ith theft, at

least theoretically, by com bining them all into the functional form of;
L =L (D ,C ,bf,0) or L -D (O ) + C (p ,0 )+ b p f0
W here,
L

= social loss

D

= net damage from the act o f theft

C

= cost o f apprehension

bf

= offender costs

12
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(2.11)

p

= probability o f conviction per offence

O

= occurrences o f crime

This m odel suggests that policy m akers can m inim ize social loss only through changes in
offender costs (f) and the probability o f conviction per offence (p). A greater expenditure
on police, courts, technology, and other m easures increases the probability that a th ief
gets caught. Increases in the sizes o f the punishm ents (i.e. higher fines or m ore prison
tim e) cause decreases in crime. The m arginal costs associated with the decrease in crime
m ust be weighed against the m arginal benefits o f the decreased in crime.

According to

this theory, finding the best com bination o f these costs and benefits determines how to
m inim ize efficiency losses due to crim inal behavior.

2.1.3 Economic Empirical Work: Ehrlich
A n econom ist w ho has contributed to the empirical testing o f the econom ic theory
o f theft is Isaac Ehrlich.^

His 1973 work, Participation in Illegal Activities: A

Theoretical and E m pirical Investigation, supports Becker’s theory.

Ehrlich begins his

analysis w ith a discussion o f what he calls the “crim inal prospect.” Ehrlich believes that
the crim inal prospect has a choice to violate the law or to rem ain law abiding.

If a

violation occurs the offender has two probable outcomes: getting away or getting caught.
The first outcom e produces an increase in w ealth, w hile the second entails a penalty.^
Based upon the Becker approach, Ehrlich’s m odels include the idea that an
increase in probability o f getting caught and punishm ent once caught affect the decision

^ His works on criminal behavior include: Insurance, Protection from Risk, and Risk-Bearing, 1985; On the
Issue o f Causality in the Economic M odel o f Crime and Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical
Considerations and Experimental Evidence, 1987; Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical
and Em pirical Investigation, 1973; Crime, Punishment, and the M arket f o r Offenses. 1996.
* This includes a psychic income component both positive and negative.

13
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o f w hether or not to engage in a crim inal activity. Ehrlich believes that there is another
im portant variable, the m arginal value o f tim e, and proposed the following m odified
model:
(2 .12)

0= 0 (p ,f,W j,W i,U ,7 t)

W here,
O

= Num ber o f Offences

P

= Probability o f getting caught

f

= O ffender Costs (punishm ents)

Wi

= The m arginal value o f tim e devoted to illegal activities

Wi

= The m arginal value o f time devoted to legal activities

u

= error term

n

= “other variables” including such things as “personal family
wealth, efficiency at self-protection, the am ount o f private
insurance provided by his fam ily (or criminal
organization)” (p. 533)

Ehrlich tested this m odel em pirically using data from the Uniform Crime Reports
o f the FBI on crimes com m itted in the United States from 1960, 1950, and 1940.
running regression analysis on the data Ehrlich concludes:
The rate o f specific crim e categories . . . varies inversely
w ith estim ates o f the probability o f apprehension and
punishm ent by imprisonm ent, and with average length o f
time served in state prisons. Crimes against property are
also found to vary positively w ith the percentage o f
families below one h a lf the m edian incom e (crim es against
the person are not affected by
income).(p. 549)
14
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After

The significance o f these results lends support to econom ic m odel o f crime
developed by Becker and supplemented by Ehrlich. The m odel suggests that through the
use o f punishm ents, changes in the probability o f getting caught, and the increasing
m arginal value o f tim e devoted to legal activities (i.e. better employm ent), it is possible
to affect the crime rate.

2.1.4 Economic Empirical Work: Corman-Mocan
The pioneering work by Becker and Ehrlich paved the w ay for the economic
study o f crime. There have been m any attem pts to test the m odel empirically. Gorman
and M ocan use tim e-series data to test a m odel based upon Becker’s theory. W hile the
Corm an-M ocan m odel is conceptually sim ilar to B ecker’s they have added a proxy legal
m arket opportunity and a variable for drug use. The m odel is expressed:
CR=f(Pol,Arr,Pov,Q)

(2.13)

W here,
CR

= the crim e rate

Pol

= the size o f the police force

A rr = crim inal arrests
Pov = poverty (a proxy o f legal m arket opportunity)
Q

= drug use

The authors test this m odel w ith data provided by the city government o f N ew
York. The data is a tim e series w ith an entry for every m onth from 1970-1996. Five
types o f crim e were investigated including m urder, assault, robbery, burglary, and m otor
vehicle theft.

15
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For all five categories, a significant relationship w as found betw een growth in the
crim e rate and num ber o f police. Drug use had a sm all effect, and the poverty/m arket
opportunity variable w as not significant. These results support B ecker’s thesis that an
increase in the probability o f getting caught (more police) will cause a decrease in the
crime rate.

2.1.5 Economie Empirical Work: Cornwell-Trumbull
M any studies have found a significant relationship exists between increases in the
offender costs and probability o f conviction w ith reduced crim e rate (Ehrlich, 1975;
W itte, 1980; Viscusi, 1986; Grogger, 1991; Levitt, 1997; Corm an and M ocan 2000).
Other studies have found either weak or nonexistent relationships betw een the variables
(M yers, Jr., 1983; Cornwell and Trumbull, 1994). The following paragraphs exam ine a
study by Com w ell-Trum bull that casts doubt on the robustness o f the empirical results
pertaining to the econom ic theory o f crime.
Cornwell and Trum bull base their study on the economic model o f crime. It is
specified as follows:
R=X’p+P’y + a+ e

(2.14)

W here,
R

= the crime rate

X'

= variables controlling for the relative return to legal opportunities

P’

= a set o f deterrent variables including probability o f arrest,
conviction and prosecution

a

= fixed effects (cross sectional m odel only)

8

= disturbance terms
16
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Based upon the statistical analysis o f this m odel the authors conclude that
previous studies using aggregate data m ight be flawed due to m isspecification.
U nobserved heterogeneity and sim ultaneity are som e statistical consequences o f using
aggregate data in studies o f crime. Controlling for these problem s, this m odel is tested
using panel and cross sectional data. In addition, a two stage least squares regression is
used.

The data and the statistical techniques led the authors to conclude that the

probability o f arrest does not provide as m uch deterrence as previous studies indicated.
These results bring to light potential problem s o f the economic approach to
crim inal behavior. M ost o f these problem s occur due to the aggregate data used in past
studies. A ccording to the authors, using data o f this type introduces endogeneity. This
specification error biases upward deterrent effects estimates, therefore any study that fails
to specify the m odel correctly risks reporting erroneous results.

2.1.6 Criticisms of the Economic Theory of Crime
As the Com w ell-T rum bull study indicates problem s exist when empirically
testing the economic m odel o f crime.

Four principal criticism s exist.

(1) Spurious

correlation between the crime rate dependent variable and crim inal enforcem ent variables
m ight be due to m easurem ent errors. (2) Criminal enforcem ent levels and crim e rates
may be sim ultaneous leading to an identification problem. (3) The variable for “crim es
cleared by conviction” represents m any crim es and the mix o f crimes is affected by
crim inal enforcem ent efforts.

(4) The potential gains to the crim inal have not been

adequately studied or specified in the models. These criticism s bring to light im portant
issues that will require further study.

Nevertheless, a m ajority o f empirical work

involving the econom ics o f crim inal behavior supports the efficacy o f the model.
17
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2.2 Social Psychological Perspective
In the field o f social psychology it was originally believed that a person’s attitude
toward the act in question w as the best w ay to explain behaviors. Through the course o f
time and exam ination o f data, a general consensus grew: explaining behavior from
attitude is unreliable. This consensus initiated the search for other variables im portant to
explaining behavior. The search led to the incorporation o f societal influences or norms
in explaining behavior culm inating in the Theory o f Reasoned Action.
The evolution o f behavioral research is discussed in subsection 2.2.1.
2.2.2 explains the Theory o f R easoned A ction (TORA).

Subsection

Finally, subsection 2.2.3

concludes the chapter w ith a critical look at the ability o f the TORA to explain behavior.

2.2.1 Development of Behavior Research
The possibility that attitude m ight explain behavior was evident from an early
point in the social sciences. In 1918 Thom as and Znaniecki (Thomas, 1918) first used
the concept o f attitude to explain social behavior.

The pair believed attitudes or

“individual mental processes” determ ined people’s actual and potential responses to
different situations.

This idea rem ains integral to m any behavioral theories; however,

studies done since suggest that attitude, as the sole explanatory variable o f behavior,
perform s poorly.
One o f the first researchers to question the explanatory power o f attitudes was
LaPiere (1938). He disagreed w ith the assum ption that the response given to a printed or
oral question reveals the attitude w hich w ould becom e operative in a situation o f the kind
referred to in that question stating: “The m easurem ent o f attitude as a m eans o f predicting
future behavior . . . [is] scientific nonsense” (p. 179). H is investigation focused on the
18
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consistency betw een the treatm ent o f a Chinese couple in hotels and restaurants and the
replies b y ow ners o f such establishm ents to a questionnaire about their acceptance o f
Chinese in general. He found virtually no consistency. Taking an interest in results o f
this experim ent Kutner, W ilkins and Yarrow (1952) attem pted to repeat it. Their results
also showed no correlation betw een attitudes and behaviors.

Based upon a survey o f the

previously discussed works along with other sim ilar works from the period Deutscher
(1966) argued that there w as no reason to expect that attitude explains any behavior.
Despite unim pressive results regarding the attitude-behavior relationship, theorists
interested in explaining behavior continued to believe that attitude played a key role. In
time, it becam e generally accepted that attitude w as responsible for only a small portion
o f behavior (W icker, 1969).

Freedm an, Carlsmith, and Sears (1970) believed that

attitude or change in attitude tends to produce behavior that corresponds with it. They
qualified this thought w ith the idea that the attitude-behavior relationship depends on
other variables that caused an inconsistency betw een the relationship.
One o f the variables thought to cause this inconsistency was termed norm ative
forces. W hen investigating m arijuana use, Acock and Defleur (1972) found that attitude
along w ith norm ative beliefs provided excellent explanation o f behavior. The insight into
the norm ative variables influence on behavior proved essential to the development o f one
o f the m ost influential m odels o f behavior, the Theory o f Reasoned Action. A discussion
o f this theory follows in subsection 2.1.2.

2.2.2 Behavior Explanation: Theory of Reasoned Action
In 1975, based on previous behavioral studies, Fishbein and Ajzen developed the
Theory o f Reasoned Action (TORA).

This theory rem ains the dom inant theoretical
19
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fram ew ork for explaining behavior within the field o f social psychology.

This is

dem onstrated by its use in countless studies including: blood donation (Bagozzi 1981;
and Cham g, Piliavin, and Callero 1988), recycling (Schultz and Oskamp 1996),
substance abuse (Grube and M organ 1990), voting (Granberg and Holm berg 1990), and
weight loss (Netem eyer, et al, 1991).
U nderstanding the TORA requires the knowledge o f the variables theorized to
influence behavior as well as how those variables are measured.

The following

paragraphs begin w ith the m athem atical construct o f the TORA and a b rief definition o f
the variables. The functional form o f the TORA will guide a m ore detailed discussion o f
each variable in turn. The equation for the TORA follows the form:
B * f(BI) = f(Aact, S N )

(2 .1 5 )

W here,
B

= behavior

BI

= behavioral intention

SN

= subjective norm s

Aact = attitude toward perform ing the specific act in question
Because B «B I the TO RA does not explain behavior (B) p e r se, it explains behavioral
intentions (BI). The construct called behavioral intentions is linked to actual behavior
through “effort” or “the attem pt to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1985, p.30).

For

exam ple a lazy person m ight have the behavioral intention to get o ff the couch (i.e.
survey results suggest she wants to get o ff the couch), yet if no effort is expended the
behavior w ill not com e to fruition.

This exam ple shows how the theory explains

behavior intentions; however, it is important to realize that these intentions do not always
20
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result in the expected behavior. The fact that the m odel explains behavioral intentions,
not actual behavior, is one o f its m ajor criticisms; this is discussed in subsection 2.2.4.
Attitude toward perform ing the specific act in question (Aact) is the next variable
o f interest. This variable com es from the following equation:
Aact= Z Pi at

(2.16)

The variable Pj represents the individual’s belief about the likelihood that the behavior in
question will result in outcom e i. This could also be thought o f as the individual’s
perceived probability that a consequence - either positive or negative - will arise from the
act in question. The variable a; represents the individual’s evaluation o f the outcome o f i
or, put another way, the variable represents the perceived consequence o f the act
(Fishbein, 1978).
G enerally semantic differential or Likert scales are employed to discover the
variables associated w ith attitude (Aact) as well as subjective norm s (SN). For example, a
person m ight be asked to respond to a question regarding her interest in sports.

A

semantic differential m ight have the following response options, very interested,
som ewhat interested, or not at all interested. A Likert scale m ight ask the respondent to
evaluate her interest on a scale from one to ten, ten being very interested.

Fishbein

em ployed the following semantic differential scales in his 1972 study m easuring the
effects o f buying a plot o f land as: foolish-wise, good-bad, harm ful-beneficial, rewardingpunishing. The sum across the four scales was then used for attitude (Aact) (Ajzen and
Fishbein, 1972).
The addition o f the variable for subjective norm s (SN) is an attempt to quantify
how the individual in question will react to w hat she perceives to be the expectation o f
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her behavior by those around her and her desire to com ply w ith those expectations.
N orm ative forces affect behavior in two ways.

First, groups exert influence on

individuals by affecting sources o f inform ation and how they evaluate it. Second, groups
assert their influence on individuals’ perception o f the w ay they should behave. The
variable subjective norm s (SN) is an attem pt to capture “peer pressure” on the
individual’s behavior and takes the follow ing form:
SN =S(nb*m c)

(2.17)

W here,
nb

= norm ative beliefs

me

= m otivation to com ply with the norm ative beliefs

Defined b y Fishbein and Ajzen (1980) norm ative beliefs (nb) are subjective, that is, a
person’s “perception that m ost people who are im portant to him think he should or should
not perform the behavior in question” (p. 57). The m otivation to comply (me) with the
norm ative beliefs (nb) represents the individual’s desire to live up to the expectations o f
those around her.
The m odel calls for sum m ing the m ultiple o f all norm ative beliefs (nb) by their
respective m otivation to com ply (me). For exam ple, a person responds to a survey that
she respects grandm a’s opinion (nb), she also m akes a strong effort to comply with
grandm a’s opinion (me). This same person respects the opinion o f her friends, yet she
m akes a sm aller effort to com ply with these opinions. The Likert scale results for strong
respect and m otivation to com ply w ith grandm a’s beliefs w ould be m ultiplied together.
Then they w ould be added to the Likert scale results o f strong respect and w eaker
m otivation to comply w ith friends’ beliefs m ultiplied together.

The resulting num ber
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w ould represent the individual’s subjective norm s regarding a specific behavior.
Theoretically this is possible; however, in practice the variable for m otivation to com ply
(me) is difficult to quantify and is usually dismissed. (Azjen and Fishbein, 1980).
N evertheless, these variables provide an excellent explanation o f behavior dem onstrated
by the use o f the Theory o f Reasoned Action in m any behavioral studies.

2.2.3 Criticisms of the Theory of Reasoned Action
W hile successes in explaining behavior w ith the TORA have occurred, there
remain criticism s o f the theory. These criticism s center upon the imprecise link between
behavior (B) and behavioral intention (BI) resulting in a reduced range o f behaviors that
can be explained using the theory.

A ccording to Liska (1984), there are two m ajor

problem s w ith the theory: (1) The theory is only good at explaining simple tasks, and (2)
the theory only explains behaviors that im m ediately follow the adm inistration o f the
survey. Follow ing is a discussion o f these two problem s.
The idea that the TORA does a better job explaining simple behaviors involves
the relationship o f behavior (B) to behavioral intention (BI). Presum ably an individual’s
“effort” can be enough to transform a behavioral intention (BI) into a behavior (B).
However, effects o f effort change as behavioral com plexity increases. The assistance o f
others and external constraints change the required effort.

The m ore complex the

behavior the less likely effort w ill transform a behavior (B) into a behavioral intention
(BI) (W right, 1998).
The other criticism o f the theory, the inability o f the TORA to explain behaviors
that do not transpire shortly after the com pletion o f the survey, is due to the instability o f
behavioral intentions over time.

Eagly and Chaiken (1992) state that the TORA has
23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“largely abandoned the question o f how intentions relate over broad tim e spans to
behaviors.”

Fishbein and Ajzen note that m axim izing the effectiveness o f the TORA

requires that researchers m inim ize the time interval betw een the m easurem ent o f
intentions and behavior (1978).
The TORA is som ewhat lim ited in the behaviors it can explain. Its lim its include
behaviors that are relatively simple and behaviors occurring shortly after the intention is
reported.

Em pirically exam ining behaviors with the TORA requires addressing these

limits. As m entioned, past studies have shown that when the lim its are taken into account
the TORA can provide a useful approach to the explanation o f behavior.
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Chapter 3
THEORIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
The literature chapter discussed two distinct m odels o f explaining criminal
behavior.

The m odel presented by Becker offers an econom ic perspective, while the

Theory o f Reasoned Action offers a social psychology viewpoint. Both theories offer
insight into the causes o f criminal behavior. Becker’s econom ic theory is influenced by
the econom ists’ emphasis on the interplay o f individual choices {Hisrchleifer, 1998). The
social psychology perspective explains how behavior is influenced by individual attitudes
and the actual, im agined or implied presence o f others (Albrecht, 1980). The previous
chapter cites empirical evidence supporting the explanatory pow er o f both models.
In this chapter, each theory is described in sim ilar terms.

There follows a

discussion o f the sim ilarities and differences betw een the theories and their disciplines.
The fact that each separately adds to the understanding o f criminal behavior argues for
com bining the contributions o f each into a synthesized theory. This synthesis takes the
form o f a B ecker model augmented with variables from the Theory o f Reasoned Action.
This synthesis will be called the augm ented Becker model.

3.1 The Becker Model
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Becker m odel o f crime assumes that
crim inals are rational individuals m axim izing their utility. It is assumed that criminals
deciding on the best course o f action evaluate both the expected income foregone by
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devoting tim e to crim inal activity and the expected value o f the return from the activity,
i.e. the costs and benefits.

The standard economic decision rule applies: if benefits

outw eigh costs the behavior is undertaken.
A ccording to the theory, if expected utility is positive, crime pays. To eliminate
crime, policy m akers m ust m anipulate the variables o f the expected utility function so
that expected utility from crime is zero or less for all m em bers o f a society.
Unfortunately, due to varying opportunity costs, the high cost o f punishm ent, and the
high cost o f increasing punishm ent’s probability, achieving zero or negative utility for all
m em bers o f society w ould be very difficult - not to m ention costly. Therefore, according
to Becker, it is im portant to find a level o f crime that “should” be allowed in order to
m inim ize the societal loss associated with crime.

Policy makers can do this by

m anipulating the level o f m oney spent on policing and punishing, thereby affecting the
expected cost o f crime.

3.2 The Theory of Reasoned Action
Independent o f the econom ists, social psychologists developed models to explain
social behavior.

One o f the m ost widely cited techniques developed by social

psychologists is the Theory o f Reasoned Action. According to the theory intention to
perform a behavior is a function o f two basic determinants, one personal in nature and the
other reflecting social influence.

The personal factor is the individual’s positive or

negative evaluation o f perform ing the behavior; this factor is term ed attitude toward the
behavior. It refers to the person’s judgm ent that perform ing the behavior is good or bad.
For exam ple some m ay have a favorable opinion o f music downloading while others do
not. The second determ inate o f behavioral intention is the person’s perspective o f the
26
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social pressures put on her to perform or not perform the behavior in question.

Because

it deals w ith forces that are perceived, this factor is term ed a subjective norm.
The im plications o f this m odel are straightforward. I f a causal relationship exists
betw een the dependant variable on the one hand and the independent variables on the
other, then it might be possible to reduce crime by changing people’s attitudes and norms.
For instance, m arketing efforts could be focused on changing these variables.

3.3 Similarities and Differences of the Models
Both the econom ic and the social psychological perspectives are concerned with
explaining behavior.

However, because the conception o f each model arose from

different academic disciplines, the two m odels vary in their approaches to explaining
behavior. Econom ics provides a theoretical base for the decision-m aking process through
the concept o f utility m axim ization. In social psychology attitudes, prim itive instincts
reinforced or repressed by socialization, cultural characteristics, group identifications,
and evolution are potential determinates o f behavior.
A n econom ist assum es that an individual’s decisions reflect attempts to achieve
desired tastes and preferences. This is the basis o f the economic theory on crime as it
posits that people are m aking a choice based upon w hether or not it adds to their utility.
The discipline o f social psychology contains no universally accepted or assumed
m otivation to behave in a particular way. In this case, an individual m akes behavioral
choices based upon her beliefs, attitudes and social forces. Thus, an econom ist might
describe an individual’s choice to eat a burger as m axim izing the individual’s happiness.
A social psychologist w ould suggest that social forces (like not being Hindi) and the fact
that the individual likes burgers resulted in her consum ption o f the burger.
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3.4 The Augmented Becker Model
Em pirical scrutiny o f both Becker’s econom ic m odel o f crim e and the Theory o f
R easoned Action reveals that both do well explaining crim inal behavior.

Thus, one

m ight hypothesize that the economic variables o f probability o f getting caught and
penalty along with the social psychology variables o f subjective norm s and attitudes are
important to explain crim inal behavior.
This thesis synthesizes the contributions o f these m odels within the fram ework o f
the economic m odel o f crime. The choice to augm ent the economic m odel with variables
from the Theory o f Reasoned Action rather than the reverse stems from the quantifiable
advantages o f the econom ic m odel allowing for policy that minim izes the social cost o f
crime.

One advantage o f the economic m odel is its inclusion o f theory specifically

designed to deal w ith crim inal behavior allowing for a direct indication o f policy
prescriptions.
Recall from the previous chapter that the individual’s decision to engage in crime
accounts for a small but important segment o f the Becker model. The prim ary focus o f
the m odel is m inim izing the social cost o f crime.

On the other hand, the Theory o f

Reasoned A ction’s prim ary focus is predicting all types o f behavior. If one is interested
in predicting or explaining a broad range o f behaviors, the Theory o f Reasoned Action
works well; however, because the economic m odel is geared specifically toward crime, it
is likely to be more useful in the context o f this thesis.
Another im portant reason for the choice o f the economic framework is the fact
that the m odel allows policym akers to m anipulate the causal variables o f crime to reach a
socially optim al point; the social psychology m odel does not.

Predicting crime m ore
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accurately by including the economic variables w ithin the fram ework o f the Theory o f
R easoned Action m ight be possible; unfortunately no policy prescriptions are apparent
w ith this approach. In contrast, augmenting the econom ic m odel allows policym akers to
influence the crim e rate w ith a target o f social optimality. The m ore variables which m ay
be rigorously identified as crime rate causes, the m ore efficiently resources (e.g.
expenditures on police, advertising cam paigns, and increased punishm ents) can be
redirected to m inim ize the social cost o f crime. Thus, the subsequent analysis will focus
on augmenting the Becker model w ith variables from the Theory o f Reasoned Action.
The augmented Becker m odel is based upon a utility m axim ization framework.
Recall that the Becker m odel posits that punishm ent and risk o f getting caught influence
the decision to steal b y changing the return to the crim inal act, or expected utility. The
variables o f the Theory o f Reasoned Action could also affect expected utility.

Consider

subjective norms. These variables represent the influence others have on an individual’s
decision. For instance one w ould probably be less likely to steal if the opinion o f others
im portant to her was unfavorable toward thieves.

Essentially, people want to please

others w hom they respect; therefore engaging in an act deem ed bad or inappropriate by
others reduces the expected utility o f crime. In the same sense, a person thinking theft is
bad m ight feel guilty for stealing. This feeling o f guilt w ould also lower the expected
utility o f crime. In a sense these factors represent punishm ent imposed by the individuals
on them selves.

This exam ple dem onstrates the rationale for augmenting the Becker

m odel w ith the variables o f attitude and subjective norms.
The augm ented Becker m odel presented here could allow policym akers to
influence the crim e rate not only by changing the probability o f getting caught and
29
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punishm ent but also by changing attitudes and subjective norms.

A discussion o f the

im plications o f the addition o f these variables is reserved for the conclusion o f the thesis.
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Chapter 4
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Chapter 3 sum m arized the Becker m odel and the Theory o f Reasoned Action and
built an augmented m odel o f crim inal behavior. The purpose o f that discussion was to set
the stage for the testing o f a crim e-specific version o f such a model. This chapter details
the necessary variables to test these models and the procedures employed to measure
each variable; however, before this discussion begins it is important to discuss some
characteristics o f the crim e being studied. The following paragraphs explain the choice
to exam ine crim inal behavior through music acquisition.
The challenge to the researcher is to find a crim inal behavior that people feel
com fortable discussing.

Recorded m usic provides such an opportunity because o f the

widespread acceptability o f illegal acquisition. In a survey o f 2,306 adults, Harris (2003)
found three in four people agree w ith the statement:

“downloading and then selling

music is piracy and should be prohibited, but downloading for personal use is an innocent
act and should not be prohibited.”

Thus, surveys o f music acquisition might provide

insightful information regarding crim inal behavior.

4.1 Variables Needed to Test the Models
This thesis tests three m odels, they are: (1) the individual decision portion o f the
econom ic m odel presented by Becker; (2) the Theory o f Reasoned Action proposed by
Fishbien; and (3) an augmented Becker m odel based upon the economic model with
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elem ents from the Theory o f Reasoned Action. This section explains what variables are
needed to test the three approaches. The variables needed for the econom ic approach are
discussed first, and the others follow.
Recall that the economic model o f crime theorizes that the chance o f getting
caught and the penalty affect the expected utility of, or return to criminal acts.
Traditional tests o f this m odel have used variables such as crime rate, num ber o f arrests
per reported crime, num ber o f police, sentencing guidelines and average punishm ent per
crime. W hile each o f these variables comes from an aggregate data source, that is not the
only w ay to test this model. Individual survey data m ay be used to determine the causes
o f crim inal behavior. For exam ple, individual data could be used for the aggregate
variable, arrests per crime, by asking survey respondents what they believe to be their
perceived chance o f getting caught.
The survey technique allows for the testing econom ic m odels o f crime in a unique
way. Instead o f a com m unity’s crime rate, individuals’ reporting o f committing or not
com m itting a crime is used as a dependant variable. Questions regarding the perceived
risk o f getting caught and perceived severity o f punishm ent along w ith socio-economic
variables allow for the testing o f the economic m odel o f crime based upon individual
level data.
W hile it is possible to test the economic m odel o f crime using aggregate or
individual level data, testing the Theory o f Reasoned Action requires individual level
data. This is due to the fact that the model is based upon individual attitudes and norms;
one can see the difficulty o f collecting an aggregate m easure o f individual ethical and
norm ative beliefs. Because the Theory o f Reasoned Action requires individual level data
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survey questions w ere developed based upon the literature. Likert scale responses to
statem ents regarding attitudes toward theft, subjective norm s, and ethical beliefs
constitute the variables needed to test this model.
Com bining the variables o f the Theory o f Reasoned Action with The Becker
model allows for the testing o f the augm ented Becker m odel o f crime. The augmented
model hypothesizes that norm s, and attitudes, together with the chance o f getting caught,
the severity o f punishm ent, and socio-economic characteristics provide a better
explanation o f criminal behavior than does either m odel alone. The augmented model
requires no further introduction o f variables. It sim ply uses variables from both the
Becker m odel o f crime and the Theory o f Reasoned Action.

4.2 Developing the Questionnaire and Collecting the Data
Guided by the literature, extended discussions by the Economics Research
Sem inar at the U niversity o f M ontana formulated a set o f questions that would provide
data for testing the three previously described m ethods o f explaining crime.
To gather data on these variables along w ith the variables from the Becker model,
the Theory o f Reasoned Action and the augmented Becker model a survey was developed
containing 40 questions. A pilot run was used to determine if there were any problem s
w ith the im plem entation o f the survey. The pilot run indicated m inor changes, including
rem oving respondents’ nam es and addresses from the questionnaire.

Appendix A

provides a eopy o f the interview form.
Betw een February 2004 and October 2005 twenty-five interviewers from the
Econom ics Research Sem inar administered five hundred questionnaires within the eity o f
M issoula M ontana.

Before the surveys were conducted interviewers were required to
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take and pass and Institutional Review Board ethics course, and the interviewers received
instruction through coursew ork as well as individually regarding proper interviewing
techniques and responsibilities.
The adm inistration o f the interviews followed strict sam pling procedures. Based
upon data and a map from the M issoula Office o f Planning and Grants, interviewers were
sent to seventeen neighborhoods constituting the entire population o f the city.

Based

upon neighborhood population relative to the city population, a set num ber o f surveys per
neighborhood were collected.
Throwing a dart or dropping a pen on each neighborhood map achieved
random ness.

The interviewer went to the random ly selected location and headed in

predeterm ined direction - north from the first point, south from the second, etc. - until
contacting a w illing interviewee aged 18 or older. The interviewer then explained the
interview form to the interviewee who then w rote his or her responses to each question
on the form and handed it to the interviewer in a sealed envelope.
To ensure that the sample accurately represented the population, socio-economic
data w as collected from the respondents and compared to the population.
shows this comparison.

Table 4.1
Comparison of the Sample Means
to the Population Means
Population Sample
31.51
Age
30.3
56%
49%
Males
2.77
2.23
Household
58%
49%
Renters
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Table 4.1

V ariation betw een the population and the sam ple m ay reflect the fact that the sample used
in this analysis is not a sam ple o f the total population; rather it is a sample o f individuals
that have acquired m usic in the last six months.

4.3 Reasons for the Use of a Survey
Because the study uses a survey rather than aggregate data there are implications
regarding the results that differ from results produced by aggregated data.

In the

aggregate case, m any studies o f crim e used the crime rate as a dependant variable. A
researcher em ploying this technique m ight be able to conclude that a rise in punishm ent
or probability o f getting caught decreases the crime rate.

However, the links to the

individual reasons for com m itting a crim e are not known. On the other hand, a survey
allows for a determ ination o f the relationship that exists betw een crime and the
characteristics o f the individuals com m itting it. This suggests individual behaviors that
m ight be influenced to reduce crim e through changes in police forces, penalties, and the
use o f m arketing techniques aim ed at influencing attitudes and norms.
From a policy standpoint, the aggregate investigation allows for policies that
change the crime rate w hile the survey approach allows for policies that reduce the
probability that an individual will steal. This difference is m inim al until one examines
the variables that are used in each approach.

A n aggregate investigation into crime

results in a lim ited num ber o f variables that can be m anipulated by policy makers.
Because aggregate data can be collected only for chance o f getting caught and penalty e.g. arrest rate and punishm ent - these variables are the only tools policym akers have to
m anipulate the crime rate. On the other hand, individual level data can explain individual
reasons people steal. This data can be collected on a w ide range o f causal variable e.g.
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attitudes, norm s, and abilities. These num bers furnish policy m akers with a m uch wider
range o f variables that m ight be m anipulated to reduce the social cost o f crime.
A nother benefit o f this type o f research is that the survey is specific to this study.
Other em pirical works have used pre-collected data sources that lack one or more
im portant variable. M any studies o f this type are forced to use proxies for variables that
are unavailable. Thus using individual surveys is a good w ay to elim inate the om itted
variable problem.
In sum m ary, a better understanding o f individual reasons w hy people steal leads
to an increase in the options policy m akers have to m anipulate the crim e rate. Avoiding
the om itted variable problem provides better testing o f the economic model o f crime.
Taken together these two exam ples provide powerful reasons for using a questionnaire to
study crime.
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Chapter 5
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The previous chapters laid the groundwork for the analysis o f three models
explaining crim inal behavior that takes place in this chapter.

The three models are

B ecker’s econom ic m odel, the Theory o f Reasoned Action, and the augmented Becker
model.

Analysis o f each m odel is discussed, in turn, following an explanation o f the

binary logistic approach to their testing.

5.1 The Logit
Engaging in theft is a choice betw een stealing and not stealing. This is known as a
dichotom ous choice and can be m easured as w hether a person (a) engages in crime or (b)
does not.

One o f the properties o f dichotom ous choice is the ability to express the

dependent variable as the odds o f an event occurring. W ithin this framework, the values
o f the independent variables’ effect on (a) and (b) can be estim ated using the logit model.
The logit w ith its cum ulative logistic distribution is not the only model o f dichotomous
choice; m odels such as the probit based upon the cumulative normal distribution are also
available.

The logit enjoys w idespread use due to m athem atical properties o f the

cum ulative logistic distribution that allow for relatively sim ple analysis. The choice to
use the logit m odel over other m odels o f binary choice seems reasonable based upon the
fact that the decision o f which binary choice m odel produces the best estimations remains
unresolved and in m any cases m akes little difference (Greene, 1990).
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B ecause the logit m odel provides a sound m ethod to explore dichotom ous choice,
it w ill be used to explain the relationship am ong the dependent variable and the
independent variables o f each model. The probability o f w hether an individual bought or
stole her last acquisition o f m usic is the dependent variable for all four models.

This

behavior (Theft) is dichotom ous, therefore:
Theft = 1 when the individual stole on her last acquisition
Theft = 0 w hen the individual bought on her last acquisition

5.2 Becker Model Results
Five hundred respondents reported acquiring music.
individuals are used in all three models.

The choices o f these 500

Here they are evaluated based upon the

following Becker model adapted from the econom ic literature:

p(Theft) = f[Caught, Penalty, Age, Gender, Edu, Lowinc, M edinc, House,
Rent]’
W here,
p(Theft)= the probability that a person steals
Caught = a respondent’s belief o f her chances o f getting caught if she
attem pted to act illegally (0-10, 10 being “great risk”)

Penalty= a respondent’s belief regarding how severe her penalty would be
if she got caught (0-10, 10 being “great risk)
Age

= age o f respondent

’ Appendix B presents the source o f each variable in this and other sections o f the analysis chapter.
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Gender = gender, where m ale is 1 female is 0
Edu

= years o f formal education (e.g. 1 year college = 13 years)

L ow inc^ if respondent’s household incom e is less than $25,000,
L ow inc= l, otherwise Lowinc=0
M edinc= if respondent’s household incom e is between $25,001 and
$50,000, M edinc= l, otherwise M edinc=0
House = the num ber o f m em bers in the respondent’s household.
Rent

= 1 if the respondent is renting, 0 otherwise

The sum m ary statistics for the variables o f interest are as follow;

Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics of Becker Variables

Caught
Penalty
Age
Gender
Edu
Lowinc
M edinc
House
Rent

M inimum M aximum
0.00
10.00
0.00
10.00
18.00
85.00
0.00
1.00
3.00
25.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
30.00
0.00
1.00

Standard
M ean Deviation
2.42
2.41
3.41
2.91
31.78
14.25
0.55
0.50
14.91
2.30
0.44
0.50
0.38
0.49
2.73
1.95
0.60
0.49

The m inim um and m axim um on caught and penalty are due to their Likert scale
m easurem ent from 0 to 10.

In the case o f caught, 10 represents a “great chance” o f

getting caught; in the case o f penalty, 10 represents “great severity.”
Table 5.2 shows the logit estim ation o f the data for the Becker model.
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Table 5.2
Becker Model Logistical Results

Caught

-0.20

S.E.
0.06

Penalty
Age
Gender

0.00
-0.08
-0.16

0.04
-0.20
0.22

0.04
-4.98*

Edu
Lowinc
Medinc
House
Rent
Constant

0.01
-0.51
-0.55
-0.12

0.05
0.37
0.08

0.28

0.30

2.40

1.07

0.09
-1.32
-1.48
-1.42
0.92
2.25*

P

t-ratio
-3.49*

0.39

-0.72

""Significant at a=.05, two sided

Before the interpretation o f the model it is im portant to test for goodness o f fit, to
perform hypothesis test on the variables, and to test for significant coefficients.

The

H osm er-Lem eshow tests w hether the data fits the logistic curve. The test generates a pvalue; a good fit is a p-value greater than .05, and in general the larger the p-value the
better the goodness o f fit. The Hosm er-Lem eshow p-value for this data is .357; thus the
logit m odel fits the data.
A com m on test to determine if all o f the slope coefficients are zero is the
likelihood ratio test.

The test is sim ilar to the F test in an ordinary least squares

regression. The likelihood ratio statistic is distributed chi-squared, and for this data set
the calculated value is 87.89 w ith 9 degrees o f freedom. The corresponding p-value is
zero, so the joint hypothesis that the coefficients are all equal to zero is rejected.
One com m only used m ethod o f determ ining the significance o f the variables in
m axim um likelihood is the asymptotic f-test. The r-test is perform ed using the standard
errors from the inform ation m atrix and critical points from the standard normal table.
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The f-tests o f the coefficient for Caught, Age and the constant are significant at the five
percent error level.
Because o f the properties o f the logit m odel, m agnitudes o f the coefficients are
not easily interpretable; however, the signs o f the coefficients are useful in revealing the
direction o f the effects. For example, because the coefficients o f Caught and Age are
negative, as their values increase the probability o f theft decreases. For the categorical
variables one could tell w hich trait is m ore likely to result in theft.

For example, if

gender proved to be statistically significant and the sign on the coefficient was negative,
m ales w ould be more likely to steal.*
Due to the difficulty o f interpreting the m eaning o f the coefficients directly, other
indirect m ethods o f interpreting the logistical results are employed.

Two o f the most

popular m ethods are exam ining the marginal effects and the elasticities o f particular
independent variables. Table 5.3 shows m arginal effects calculated at the means, the
m eans o f the individual marginal effects, and the elasticity at the means.

Table 5.3
Magnitude of the Effects of Becker Model
Significant Independent Variables

Caught
Age

Calc at M ean o f
the Individual Elasticity
M eans Effects at M eans
-0.035
-0-033
-0.373
-0.014
-0.014
-1.990

An ordinary least squares regression produces a straight line; a binary logistical
regression does not.

Therefore, the slope is constantly changing. The slope could be

increasing at an increasing or decreasing rate depending on what point is chosen along
®The gender example is used for illustrative purposes; it is not statistically significant.
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the function.

The m arginal value calculated at the m ean is the slope o f the logit function

at the m ean o f the variable in question holding all other variables constant at their means.
For Caught, evaluated at its mean, a one-unit increase in the Likert Scale value (i.e., a
person m oves one unit - out o f 10 - closer to believing she has a “great chance o f getting
caught”) translates into a decrease in the probability o f theft o f 3.5 percentage points.
The average m arginal effect, or the average slope as one goes from the lowest value to
the highest value o f an independent variable, is largest for Caught. This suggests that
every unit increase for a person at the m inim um who thinks there is a “great chance o f
getting caught” results in a 3.3 percentage point reduction in probability o f theft. This is
an average result that continues until the person reaches the m axim um point where the
individual thinks there in no risk o f getting caught. The elasticity is a ratio o f percentage
changes. Thus, for C aught (at its m ean) a ten percent increase would lead to a 3.7 percent
decrease in the probability o f theft. These statistics help to explain the magnitudes o f the
independent variables.
The previous values are exact m easurem ents o f the m agnitudes o f effects. The
elasticity and the m arginal effects calculated at the m ean do not represent the entire range
o f responses but one point along the function.

On the other hand, the m ean o f the

m arginal effects represents the entire range o f responses. Although this statistic can be
useful, it is very sensitive to extrem e points on the function. Therefore because the first
two statistics only explain one point along the function and the last statistic is sensitive to
outliers, it is useful to look at the logistical function in graphical form. A graph o f this
type shows the relationships along the entire function.
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Figure 5.1
B ecker Model:
Effect of Getting Caught on the Probability of Theft,
Holding Ail Else Constant at the Mean
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Figure 5.1 shows how the individual’s perception o f the probability o f getting
caught effects the probability she engages

theft. The probability o f theft for a person

believing she has a lim ited chance o f getting caught (a value o f one on the Likert scale) is
approxim ately 27 percent.

On the other extreme, a person believing she has a “great

chance o f getting caught” (a value o f ten on the Likert scale) w ould likely steal
approxim ately 7.5 percent o f the time.

The fact that Caught is statistically significant

allows us to conclude that people who believe that they have a high chance o f getting
caught will have a lower probability o f com m itting theft, all else constant.
Age is the other independent variable that is significant.

The average person

responding to the survey was approxim ately 32 years old. According to the regression
w hen a person representing the average case turns 33 her expected probability o f stealing
would go dow n b y 1.4 percentage points. In fact the data explains that on average 1.3
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percentage point change in probability o f theft could be expected across the spectrum o f
ages. Figure 5.2 shows the effect o f age on the probability o f stealing over the range o f
ages. Because age is significant, the conclusion can be drawn that an older person is less
likely to steal than a younger person.

Figure 5.2
Becker Model:
Effect of Age on the Probability of Theft,
All Else Constant at the Means
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Table 5.4 presents results m easuring the predictive capability o f this logit model.
It looks at the predicted values o f p(Theft) and com pares them w ith the actual values.
The model predicts buying correctly 92.7 percent o f the time. The model predicts theft
with only 25.5 percent success. Together the m odel correctly predicts legal and illegal
behavior 73.2 percent o f the time. Seventy one percent o f the sam ple legally acquired
their last music. In this case, since a person guessing “legal” every time w ould be correct
71 percent o f the time, the 71 percent guess works nearly as well as the model.
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Table 5.4
Successful Prediction by the Becker Model
Predicted

Predicted
Correct

Actual
Actual
Overall

Observed
B uy
Theft

Buy

Theft
329
329

26
37

92.7%
25.5%
73.2%

Table 5.4 does not represent the goodness o f fit o f the model. The tem ptation to
use the table for goodness o f fit should be resisted according to K ennedy (2003).

In

addition, there is disagreem ent among scholars concerning the usefulness o f the
predictive ability o f the logit m odel. The rational for such disagreem ent can be strong in
cases w ere odds o f a particular outcom e are relatively high. Failure to steal m usic by
respondents in this study is a case in point. Predicting the lack o f stealing adds little to
the understanding o f crim inal behavior. Since the goal o f this study is to explain crim inal
behavior and furnish guidelines for its potential modification, prediction is not
particularly relevant.

5.3 Theory of Reasoned Action Results
Separate analysis o f the logit regression for the sam e sample o f 500 individuals
allow ed for a test o f the Theory o f R easoned A ction. Testing o f the m odel followed the
equation:
p(theft) = f(attitude, norm s)
W here,
p(theft) = the probability that a person steals
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N orm s = subjective norm s, a respondent’s belief o f what people
important to them think about m usic theft
A ttitude = the sum o f the respondent’s attitudes toward perform ing music
theft
Table 5.5 shows the statistics for the variables o f interest.

Table 5.5
Descriptive Statistics of Theory of Reasoned Action
1

Attitude
Norm s

M inimum
-20.00
-10.00

M axim um
20.00
10.00

Std.
M ean
D eviation
1.02
6.50
.12 i
5.91

The m inim um and m axim um values o f -1 0 to 10 o f norm s reflect the m inim um and
m axim um o f their Likert scale measurement. The m inim um and m axim um o f attitude are
due to the aggregation o f five attitude questions based upon the literature. This formula
contains two questions about the industry (e.g., how fair is the amount artists earn, and
how do you feel about the m usic industry) are averaged together and summed with three
questions about personal beliefs (e.g. how ethical is theft, does it harm anyone, and
should people who engage in it be punished). The range o f the attitude scale, from +20 to
-2 0 , w as arbitrary set to rem ind the reader that it includes five Likert scale values. These
values represent attitude toward the act as well as ethical considerations as defined by the
literature.
The following paragraphs discuss hypothesis tests. To evaluate the model three
hypothesis tests are considered. The first test is the Hosm er-Lem eshow test to determine
if the logit fram ework is appropriate for the data.

It generates a p-value o f .41, and

46

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

because .41 is greater than .05 this hypothesis test confirm s that the m odel is appropriate
for the data set.

The second hypothesis test, used to evaluate w hether or not the

coefficients are zero, is the likelihood ratio test.

The likelihood ratio statistic is

distributed chi-squared. The test value for this m odel is 52.9 w ith 2 degrees o f freedom.
This value is greater than the critical value o f 5.99 at the five percent error level. Thus,
the jo in t hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero is rejected.
The next step in the analysis is to determ ine the significance o f the variables in
question w ith the classic f-test. A calculated value is com pared to a critical value. In this
m odel all coefficients are significant at the five percent error level. Table 5.6 presents
these results.

Table 5,6
Theory of Reasoned Action Logistical Results
B

S.E.
.018
.020
107

Attitude -.69
Norms
-.078
Constant .926

f-ratio
-3.84*
-3.78*
-8.67*

* Significant at a=.05, two tailed

The signs o f the coefficients in a logit regression are particularly important. In
this case both coefficients are negative. This m eans as the values o f Attitude and Norm s
increase the probability o f theft decreases.

This is in line w ith the hypothesis o f the

theory chapter.
W hile the coefficients convey inform ation regarding the direction o f the effects,
they reveal little about the m agnitude o f the effects. As discussed in the previous section,
understanding the m agnitude o f the effects requires the calculation o f the marginal
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effects, the m ean o f the m arginal effects and the elasticities.

Table 5.7 presents these

results.

Table 5.7
Magnitude of the Effects Theory of Reasoned
Action Significant Independent Variables
Calc at M ean o f
the
Individual Elasticity
M eans
Effects
at M eans
Attitude -0.013
-0.013
-0.050
N orm s
-0.014
-0.015
-0.007

For A ttitude evaluated at its m ean, a one-unit increase in the index value (i.e., a person
m oves one unit closer to believing theft is ethical, no one gets harmed, etc.) translates
into an increase in the probability a person will steal by 1.3 percentage points.

The

average m arginal effect o f norm s betw een the values o f -10 to 10 is -1 .4 percentage
points. The elasticity at the means is a ratio o f the percentage changes; thus for Attitude a
ten percent increase im plies a .5 percent decrease in the probability o f the theft, all else
constant calculated at the means. Figure 5.3 helps to illustrate these effects.
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Figure 5.3
Theory of Reasoned Action:
Effect on Attitude, All Else Constant at the Means
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A person w ith an attitude presum ed to be com pletely accepting o f stealing is represented
by the value —20. A ccording to the regression, an individual w ith this attitude bas
approxim ately a 60 percent probability o f stealing. As attitude changes toward
disapproval o f theft, the probability o f theft decreases to below 10 percent.
Changes in norm ative beliefs also change the probability that theft will occur.
Figure 5.4 illustrates how different values o f norm ative beliefs affect the summed value
o f attitudes.
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Figure 5.4
Theory of Reasoned Action:
Change In Attitude while Holding Norms Constant
at -10, -5, 0, 5, and 10
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The graph shows how N orm s affect the relationship between Attitudes and theft. Norms
are held constant at five levels as Attitude varies. The values o f -2 0 for Attitude and -1 0
for norm s represent an individual presum ed to be the m ost likely thief. The regression
shows that a person representing these values w ould likely steal around 78 percent o f the
time.

This is the highest percentage o f theft explained by the regression. This is

represented on graph by the line w ith diam onds at the point where Attitude equals -2 0 .
Now, consider a person w ith the sam e A ttitude value, -20, but with a Norm value
representing no perm issiveness to stealing (norm=10).

This person has a far lower

probability o f theft than a person whose friends think it is ok; they would likely steal 42
percent o f the time.

As shown in Figure 5.4 N orm s has the greatest impact on the
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probability o f theft w hen people have attitudes perm issive to theft. It can be seen that
there is a w ider range o f probabilities for a person w ith a perm issive attitude as Norms
change than at the other extreme.

As Norm s change fi-om -1 0 to +10, a person with

perm issive attitudes probability o f theft varies approxim ately 35 percentage points, while
a person w ith a non-perm issive attitudes probability o f theft varies by 10 percentage
points.

As attitude becom es m ore perm issive toward theft the change in norm ative

beliefs has less o f an impact on the probability o f theft. The variables o f the theory tested
here are significant and helpful in explaining theft behavior.

Table 5.8
Successful Prediction by the Theory of Reasoned Action
Predicted

Predicted
Correct

Actual
Actual
Overall

Observed
Buy
Theft

Buy

Theft
328
115

27
30

92.4%
20.7%
71.6%

Table 5.8 presents results m easuring the predictive capability o f this logit model.
It looks at the predicted values o f p(theft) and com pares them w ith the actual values. The
m odel predicts buying correctly 92 percent o f the time. The m odel predicts theft with
only 20 percent success. Together the m odel correctly predicts legal and illegal behavior
72 percent o f the tim e.

The naive m odel, w hich considers all people to be buyers,

predicts correctly 71 percent o f the time. The predictive pow er o f this model is minimal,
how ever as noted earlier this m ay have little bearing on the conclusions o f the study.
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5.4 Augmented Becker Model Results
A s discussed in the theory section, the augm ented m odel explains how variables
in both the Theory o f Reasoned Action and the Becker m odel m ay affect crim e through
changes in expected utility. It takes the functional form:
p(Theft) = ft Attitude, Norm s, Caught, Penalty, Age, Gender, Edu, Lowinc,
M edinc, House, Rent]
Because the variables are the same as in the two previous analyses, the sum m ary statistics
are not presented.
The same hypothesis tests discussed in the previous sections were used to
determine the validity o f the model. The H osm er-Lem eshow test generated a p-value o f
.099 suggesting that the m odel fits. The likelihood ratio test generated the test statistic o f
111.

W ith eleven degrees o f freedom the critical value is approxim ately 20; thus the

slope coefficients are not zero.
The likelihood ratio test was also conducted to determ ine if additional variables
were useful in explaining the data. Two hypothesis tests were performed; one testing the
augmented model w ith variables from the Theory o f Reasoned Action (restricting the
B ecker variables), and one testing the m odel w ith just the Becker variables (restricting
the Theory o f Reasoned A ction variables).

These tests resulted in a p-value o f zero,

confirm ing that the augm ented B ecker m odel is m ore useful in explaining the probability
o f theft than either o f the other m odels alone.
Table 5.9 presents the results for the logit regression on this model. Significance
is determ ined by the asym ptotic t- test and is denoted by a star.
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Table 5.9
Augmented Becker Model Logit Results
Caught
Penalty
Attitude
Norm s
Age
Gender
Edu
Lowinc
M edinc
House
Rent
Constant

P
-0.19
0.05
-0.06
-0.05
-0.07
-0.28
0.02
-0.69
-0.70
-0.10
0.28
1.91

S.E.
t-ratio
0.06
-3.23*
0.04
1.05
0.02
-3.10*
0.02
-2.27*
0.02
-4.35*
0.23
-1.71
0.06
0.27
-1.71
0.40
0.38
-1.83
0.09
-1.22
0.31
0.91
1.10
1.74

’•‘significant at a=.05, two sided

The coefficients on Caught, Attitude, Norm s, and Age are all significant. Because each
o f these coefficients is negative, an increase in their value represents a decrease in the
probability o f theft. D eterm ining the m agnitude o f these effects requires the calculation
o f the three other statistics presented in Table 5.10.

Table 5.10
Magnitude of Effects of Augmented Becker
Calc at M ean o f
the
Individual Elasticity
M eans
Effects at M eans
Caught
Attitude
Norm s
Age

-0.032
-0.011
-0.008
-0.012

-0.010
-0.008
0.031
0.011

-0.354
-0.050
-0.005
-1.728
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The interpretation o f Table 5.10 is sim ilar to the previous analysis. For example,
with Attitude evaluated at its mean, a one-unit increase in the index value (i.e., a person
m oves one unit closer to believing theft is ethical, no one gets harmed, etc.) translates
into an decrease in the probability a person will steal by 1.1 percentage points.

The

average m arginal effect o f attitude as it varies fi'om -20 to 20 is -.8 percentage points.
The elasticity at the m eans is a ratio o f the percentage changes. Thus, for Attitude a 10
percent increase im plies a .5 percent decrease in the probability o f the theft, all else
constant calculated at the means. The following figures (Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7)
help to illustrate these effects.

Figure 5.5
Augmented Model: Effect of Caught on the Probability of Theft,
All Else Constant at the Means
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10

Figure 5.6
Augmented Model: Effect of Attitude on the Probability of Theft,
Ait Else Constant at the Means
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Figure 5.7
Augmented Model: Effect of Normativie Beliefs on the Probability
of Theft, All Else Constant at the Means
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Figure 5.8
Augmented Model: Effect of Age on the Proababiiity of Theft,
All Else Constant at the Means
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
H
o 0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
Oh

I

0.05
15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

Age
W ithin the framework o f the augmented m odel, each graphed variable affects the
probability o f theft holding all other variables constant at their means. The next figures
are sim ilar to Figure 5.8. However, instead o f holding all variables constant, one other
variable (Caught for Figure 5.9, Attitude for Figure 5.10 and Norm s for Figure 5.11) is
fixed at different levels. The following graphs show how age interacts with the three
rem aining significant variables.
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Figure 5.9
Augmented Model: Effect of Age at Five Levels of Caught, All Else
Constant at the Means
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Figure 5.10
Augmented Model: Effect of Age at Five Levels of Attitude, All Else Constant
at the Means
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Attitude=20

Figure 5.11
Augmented Model: Effect of Age at Five Levels of Norms, All Else
Constant at the Means
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The interpretation o f figures Figure 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 are very sim ilar to the
interpretation o f Figure 5.4 in the previous section.

The variables o f Caught, Attitudes, Norm s, and Age are significant in explaining
theft w ithin the augmented model. The augmented m odel also perform s better than the
Becker, or Theory o f Reasoned Action m odels at predicting the behavior, as
dem onstrated in Table 5.11.

Table 5.11
Successful Prediction by the Augmented Becker Model
Predicted

Predicted
Correct

Actual
Actual
Overall

Observed
Buy
Theft

Buy

Theft
32
53

323
92

91.0%
36.6%
75.2%
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These results suggest that the Augm ented M odel is capable o f predicting theft behavior
correctly 75.2 percent o f the time. This is 5.1, 2, and 3.6 percentage points better than the
naive m odel (picking the m ost likely response each time), the Becker Model, and the
Theory o f R easoned A ction respectively.
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Chapter 6
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal o f this thesis was to exam ine em pirically the highly complex nature o f
crim inal behavior using theories tailored to identifying crim inal antecedents.

This

approach allowed for the quantifiable evaluation o f differing policy prescriptions
designed to elim inate or reduce crime. Fundam ental characteristics o f the data choice,
collection m ethods, theory, and analysis contributed to accomplishing the analysis
presented in this thesis.

Exploiting these characteristics facilitated the testing o f the

econom ic m odel o f crime, the social psychological m odel and the development and
testing o f a theory encom passing both the economic and social psychological
perspectives term ed the augm ented Becker model.

6.1 The Use of Individual Level Data
Individual level data has not typically been used in criminal studies due to the
difficulty o f collecting individual data and the belief that people do not wish to discuss
their crim inal activities.

The reliance on aggregated data presents problem s for, and

limits the ability of, the researcher exam ining crim inal behavior economically. Survey
data is not without its problem s and requires changing the w ay variables have been
measured. Nevertheless, the advantages o f using individual data outweigh the difficulty
o f its collection. Thus, this thesis uses a unique crim e (music theft) and survey data to test
three m odels o f crim inal behavior.
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One benefit o f individual level data is the avoidance o f statistical problems.
Em pirical studies em ploying aggregate level data in their analysis have generated some
im pressive results (see Chapter 2); however, the use o f aggregate data can be
troublesom e.

Endogeneity stemming from the likely dependency o f the probability o f

arrest or the size o f the police force on the crim e rate is difficult to handle
econom etricaliy.

This sim ultaneity problem causes inconsistency in ordinary least

squares estimators. Tw o-stage and three-stage least squares have been used by Ehrlich
(1973), Phillips and Votey (1976), and Craig (1987) in an attempt to eliminate this
problem .

A lthough, it is probable that the results o f these studies were corrupted by

unobserved heterogeneity (Cornwell, Trumbull, 1994).
In addition to avoiding the econometric problem s associated with aggregate data,
there are three m ajor advantages to the use o f individual data. First, the theory o f crime
explains individual behavior, thus the need for individual data. Underlying the model is
the idea that one can m anipulate the crime rate by changing variables that affect
individuals’ expected utility return from the criminal behavior.

Because o f this, the

econom ic m odel o f crim e should be estim ated w ith individual level data.
The second advantage o f the individual level data approach is that survey data
allows for the testing o f additional variables. In this thesis it is theorized that the chance
o f getting caught and punishm ent are not the only variables that affect expected utility;
individuals’ attitudes and their perceptions o f what people important to them think
(subjective norm s) are also theorized to have an influence on individuals’ expected utility
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return.^

Collecting data on these variables requires a survey. The new variables m ake it

possible to expand upon the conclusions o f the traditional econom ic approach; however,
because o f the reliance on aggregate data, the crime literature reports no attem pt to
integrate these variables into the fram ework o f the econom ic m odel o f crime and
em pirically test it.
The final advantage o f individual level data involves precise definition o f all
variables in the study.

Collecting survey data allows for the direct selection o f

information to be gathered. This is an im provem ent to relying on data collected by others
because it m easures the exact variables suggested by the theory and m akes it easier to
identify the d ata’s strengths and weaknesses.
W hile avoiding som e problem s associated w ith aggregate data, individual level
data is not above reproach. The fact that surveys can be subpoenaed and the information
can be used to convict the respondent is a m ajor concern. Because o f the sensitivity o f
the inform ation, it is im portant to keep inform ation anonym ous and choose a crime that
people feel com fortable discussing; m usic theft was identified as just such a crime.
The use o f m usic theft as the dependent variable - as opposed to the crime rate is one exam ple o f a change in the way individual variables are measured. Traditional
aggregate econom ic variables such as the num ber o f arrests per crime reported, and the
penalty for each crim e m ust also be altered.

These variables w ere replaced with the

individuals’ reporting o f their belief regarding the chance o f getting caught and their
belief regarding the likely penalty.
^ This idea comes from the attempts that have been made to manipulate attitudes and subjective norms to
reduce the crime rate. The 'friends don’t let friends drink and drive” campaign is an appeal to subjective
norms, while Mother’s Against Drunk Driving uses video o f children killed by drunk drivers to influence
attitudes.

62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The use o f music theft as the basis for the collection o f individual data makes it
possible to exploit the advantages o f this approach and avoid the problem s inherent in the
aggregate approach.

Individual data allows econom etric problem s to be avoided,

im proved testing o f individual behavior, new conclusions to be drawn, and m ore accurate
definition o f the variables.

Because o f these benefits, survey data provides the

foundation for the em pirical analysis o f this thesis.

6.2 Comparison of the Three Models
The three m odels presented in the analysis chapter are the Becker m odel, the
Theory o f Reasoned A ction, and the augmented Becker Model.

The Becker model is

essentially aimed at exploring the relationship that Caught and Penalty have with theft.
The Theory o f Reasoned Action is a m ore general behavioral model. It is concerned with
how the variables o f attitudes and subjective norm s affect behavior.

The augmented

Becker m odel is an attem pt to combine elements from each o f the proceeding m odels in
an effort to provide a better understanding o f crim inal behavior.
All three o f these m odels were tested using the technique o f binary logistical
regression.

Binary logistical regression does not have a m eaningful equivalent to the

correlation coefficient o f least squares regression. Because o f this fact, there are no easy
com parisons betw een the m odels. H ow ever, several scholars have devised formulas that
approxim ate the correlation coefficient. Results o f these formulas are presented in Table
6 . 1.
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Table 6.1
Logistic Approximations for the
Square of the Correlation Coefficient
Estrella
M addala
Crag-U hler
M cFadden

Becker
0.17
0.16
0.23
0.15

TORA
0.10
0.10
0.14
0.09

Augm ented
0.22
0.20
0.28
018

Table 6.1 provides further evidence that the augm ented Becker m odel explains
crim inal behavior better than the Becker or the Theory o f Reasoned Action alone. This is
due to the fact that every calculation o f the proxy
model than in the other two.

value is greater in the augmented

The Becker m odel and the Theory o f Reasoned Action

explain crim inal behavior. Integrating the two m odels, however, within the framework o f
the econom ic model, increases the explanatory pow er o f the m odel and provides those
interested in crime prevention more options to reduce criminal activities.

6.3 Policy Implications
The econom ic m odel o f crime is not geared toward ending crime p e r se; the goal
is to m inim ize the efficiency loss associated with it. Thus, m any economic studies have
been designed to aid policy m akers in selecting the optimal level o f expenditures on
enforcem ent (to increase the probability o f getting caught) and penalties. For example, if
crim inal enterprises w ere costing society $500 a year it would be worth up to $500 to
stop the activity. The basic econom ic m odel w ould try to stop the crime by dividing up
the $500 am ong the m ost effective crime prevention strategies. M ore specifically, the
m arginal cost o f prevention is com pared to the m arginal benefit o f the reduction in crime.
This could be a m ix betw een funding m ore police and increasing the penalty, or all the
64
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m oney could go to increasing the penalty.'®
psychology variables.

This m odel does not include the social

The addition o f attitudes and norm s gives policy m akers more

options to achieve an optim al solution to the problem o f crim inal behavior.
U nderstanding how this m odel helps in achieving an optimal crime strategy
requires revisiting the results. In the logistic output o f the augm ented Becker m odel the
coefficients for chance o f getting caught, attitude, subjective norm s and age were
significant. Because o f their significance, it could be concluded that m anipulation o f any
o f these variables could affect an individual’s probability o f engaging in music theft."
Consider the possibility o f changing what an individual representing the average case
thought to be the probability o f getting caught by one unit. This change would decrease
theft by 3.2 percentage points. A sim ilar change in attitude w ould decrease theft by 1.1
percentage points. A one unit increase in norm s w ould decrease theft by .8 percentage
points. If the costs o f increasing these variables by one unit were known, it w ould be
possible to choose the best course o f action.

This would help generate the optimal

reduction o f theft.

6.4 Industry Application
Im plications exist for firms interested in preventing theft.

Business and

institutions suffering losses from theft eould benefit from em ploying the same teehniques
described in the previous section.

In addition businesses and institutions have other

options available w hen attem pting to m itigate the negative aspects o f theft. This thesis

Some penalties carry additional cost to society ( i.e., lost wages, lost productivity, etc); however for the
illustrative case presented here this fact will be ignored.
' ' Age, o f course, cannot be manipulated.
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has exam ined music theft; thus the exam ples used here are directly related to the music
industry.
Typically, a com pany w ishing to prevent theft has fewer resources available than
the governm ent to com bat theft.

For exam ple they cannot arrest and convict people.

Nevertheless, a com pany w ishing to prevent theft m ay have m eans to deter theft
unavailable to the governm ent. In the case o f music theft, age is a significant variable.
The older the respondent, the less likely she is to steal. Based upon this result, the music
industry m ay w ish to introduce a differential pricing m odel based upon age.

Student

discounts and other offers aimed at young people m ight help to reduce theft in this
segm ent o f the population.
A nother factor that the industry can influence is attitudes. Because perception o f
the music industry and recording artists are a com ponent o f the attitude variable, image is
also important.

Confidentiality clauses about the artists’ com pensation and marketing

prom oting qualities o f the industry are some o f the strategies that could be employed to
reduce music theft.
Firm s have a clear m otivation for understanding theft behavior. According to the
results, altering acquisition behavior requires changing the chance o f getting caught,
attitudes, norms, and age.

Firms interested in persuading m ore people to buy their

products have some ability to m anipulate these variables.

6.5 Suggestions for Further Study
The econom ic m odel o f crim e and the Theory o f Reasoned Action have been the
basis for m any studies. W hile each m odel has been evaluated separately, this thesis may
be the first attem pt to integrate these concepts w ithin the firamework o f utility
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m axim ization. In any case, there is little economic literature that encom passes both o f
these approaches at once. The im plications o f the augm ented Becker m odel, along with
the significance o f the results, suggest that further research on this subject could be
beneficial in gaining a better understanding o f crim inal behavior.
There are four specific suggestions for further study presented here. The first is to
attem pt to verify the conclusions o f this study using other crim inal behaviors. People
m ight be forthcom ing in divulging inform ation about other crim inal behaviors such as
highw ay speed limits or hunting and fishing regulations. Even m ore deviant behaviors
m ight be explored because, in general, respondents were forthcoming about their
behavior. W hen adm inistering the questionnaires the U niversity’s Institutional Review
Board appeared m ore concerned w ith the inform ation than the respondents. If admitting
to m usic theft is indicative o f other studies on crime, survey responses should be
obtainable.
The second suggestion for further study involves the variable for subjective
norms.

In the literature this is described as w hat others important to the individual in

question think o f her behavior. Generally, this variable is disaggregated into questions
such as, “W hat would your co-workers think about this behavior?” and “W hat would
your fam ily think?”

For this thesis this was not the case. The variable for subjective

norm s cam e from the Likert r e s p o n s e t o question 26 on the survey: “The fact that many
other people download m usic for free m akes it ok for me to do it.” While this question
offers a decent proxy for the variable subjective norm s, it w ould have been desirable to
have disaggregated inform ation consistent w ith the literature.

-10 = Strongly Disagree, 10 = Strongly Agree
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A nother area o f study that could prove w orthwhile w ould be an exam ination o f
the relationship o f actions already undertaken to decrease the crim e rate through
m anipulation o f norm s and attitudes.

In M ontana there are m arketing efforts aimed at

reducing the consum ption o f alcohol among young people, one o f which is entitled the
“m ost o f us” cam paign. This effort offers statistics claim ing m ost people do not engage
in alcohol consum ption. It is an appeal to subjective norms. Evaluating cam paigns o f
this sort w ould be valuable. The ability to alter norm s and - if norm alteration proved
successful - the effect changing norm s have on behavior could provide policy guidance.
The final suggestion for further study presented in this thesis concerns evaluation
o f the costs associated with m anipulation o f the variables from the augmented Becker
model. C onsider the following scenario:
Increasing the chance o f getting caught by one Likert scale
unit decreases the probability o f theft by 5 percentage points.
Changing norm ative beliefs by increasing one Likert scale
unit also decreases the probability o f theft by 5 percentage
points.
It cost $50,000 to hire one m ore police officer;
study indicates that the addition o f this officer is expected to
increase the likelihood someone gets caught by one Likert
scale unit. A m arketing cam paign (e.g. billboards, print ads
and com m ercials) is designed to influence norm ative beliefs.
The cam paign costs $200,000 and is expected to increase the
Likert scale value o f norm s by one unit.

In this simple scenario, it is obvious a new police officer should be hired. The
sam e five percent reduction in crime can be reached by a quarter o f the expenditure.
Some com plications arise due to the changing slope o f the logistical function. However,
it is possible to calculate increm ental increases or decreases in probability o f theft and
their corresponding Likert scale values. Because this possibility exists, knowing the cost
Assume these figures are at the mean, all else constant.
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associated w ith m oving a person along the Likert scale could help determine the best
policy options. Techniques are available to evaluate these costs; their evaluation could
prove w orthw hile in determ ining the policy m ix that best reduces crim inal behavior.

6.6 Conclusion
Past economic studies o f crime concentrated on aggregate data. This prevented
the testing o f some o f the variables shown in this thesis to explain criminal behavior.
Analysis o f data collected from surveys revealed the traditional economic variable o f
Caught explains m usic theft.

In addition to this result, Attitude and Norms were also

significant in explaining theft. Integrating these results into the augmented Becker model
revealed that all three variables explain theft m ore accurately. This result would not have
been possible using aggregate data.
It has been show n that evaluating criminal behavior by analyzing individuals’
responses introduces A ttitudes and Norm s into the classic economic model o f crime.
Personal guilt (Attitudes), peer pressure (Norms), and the chance o f getting caught
(Caught) affect the expected utility o f a crim inal act. In theory, decreasing the expected
utility gain from engaging in crim e lowers the crim e rate. Those w ishing to decrease the
crim e rate need only reduce the crim e’s expected utility. These two new variables extend
the options available to parties interested in m oderating crim inal behavior. The results o f
this thesis establish an encouraging addition to the econom ics o f crime. Combined with
future em pirical work, these results have the potential to inspire approaches that are more
effective in m inim izing the losses associated with crim inal activity.
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Appendix A
QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE
1) Do you have access to a computer?
Yes
No
2) If yes, is it connected to the Internet?
Yes
No
3) If yes, w hat type o f Internet connection do you m ost often use?
Dial-Up (a slower connection)
DSL, Cable, Satellite, T1 or greater (a faster connection)
4) W hat ways do you have available to play recorded m usic? (check all that apply)
CD player (portable, auto or home)
Cassette Tape player
MP3 player (separate from your computer)
Com puter
Phonograph (record player)
5) Have you acquired audio music in the last 6 m onths? (Purchased or downloaded for
free or paid)
Yes
No
If N O go to question num ber 35.
Consider the last tim e you acquired m usic (purchased or downloaded for free or paid).
6 ) ___________How m any songs did you acquire (average CD has about 12-15 songs)?
7) On w hat form w as the m usic?
CD
Data file (M P3, W AV, etc)
Tape
Record
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8) W here did you get this m usic (check only one)?
a )_____Bought N EW at a physical store
b )_____ Bought N EW at an Internet store
c )_____ Bought USED at a physical store
d )_____ Bought USED at an Internet store (e.g. half.com , amazon.com, etc.)
e )_____ Internet paid download (e.g. iTunes, M usicm atch, Rhapsody,
BuyM usic.com , etc)
f)_____M ail order (e.g. m usic club), advertisem ent (e.g. TV, radio), catalog
g )____ Internet unpaid download (e.g. Kazaa, M orpheus, iMesh, etc.)
h )____ Y ou copied borrow ed music from a friend
i )_____ Friend copied music for you
j)_____ Borrow ed and returned
k)____ Borrowed and did not return
I)_____ Prom otional free music
Answer questions 9 a and b only if you paid for the last music (a,b,c,d,e or f).
9a) $__________________ How m uch m oney did you spend?
9b) $__________________ Assum e the m usic had a higher price than you paid, how high
w ould that price have to reach before you acquire the m usic without paying for it? (Go to
question 11 )
Answer question 10 a and b only if you checked g, h, or i in question 8.
10a) $________________ How m uch would this m usic have cost you if you bought? (Give
your best estimate)
10b) $________________ How m uch less w ould your estim ated price need to have been
for you to have bought this music?
The follow ing questions relate to how m uch time you spent in the process o f getting the
music. Please read all four before answering them.
11)
M INUTES
How m uch tim e did vou spend deciding which
m usic you wished to get (research, reading reviews from m agazines or the Internet,
com paring m usic, listening to samples on the w eb, etc..) for this last music?
12 ) ___________M INUTES
How m uch tim e did you spend getting to the source
o f m usic you obtained (travel tim e to store, web surfing time, calling friends, etc.)?
13 ) ___________M INUTES
H ow m uch tim e did vou spend actually acquiring
this m usic (checkout time, brow sing time, burning time, download time, etc.)?
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14)
I f you borrow ed audio m usic from the library.
M INUTES
friend, etc, and copied onto a personal source (e.g. CD, tape, computer) please add the
tim e you spent returning the audio music.
The follow ing questions relate to your attitudes —please m ark vertically on the scale on
where your attitude fits w ith the question. (W hen we say “free” m usic we do not m ean
prom otional, stream ing radio, or music provided by the artist for free.)
15) How m uch do you enjoy m usic?
Dislike M usic
-10
I-----------------------------1-----------------

0
4-

16) H ow m uch do you enjoy copying your own tapes or C D ’s?
Dislike
-10
0
I-----------------------------1-----------------------------1-------------------------

Very M uch Enjoy
10
1

Very M uch Enjoy
10
1

17) How m uch does m arketing (e.g. packaging, lyrics, posters, fan clubs, etc.) influence
your purchase o f audio music?
N o Influence
Great Influence
-10
0
10
I-----------------------------1-----------------------------1-----------------------------1-----------------------------1

18)1 use the web to discover new music.
Never
-10
I-----------------------------1-----------------------

0
-+ ■

19) How com fortable are you using a computer?
U ncom fortable
-10
0
I
1-----------------------------1----

20) I am good at finding free m usic on the Internet.
Strongly D isagree
-10
0
I
1-----------------------------1-------72
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Always
10
1

Comfortable
10
1

Strongly Agree
10

21)1 am good at finding paid music on the Internet.
Strongly D isagree
Strongly Agree
-10
0
10
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

22) How w ould you rate the quality o f the sound on the last recording you acquired (not
the artist)?
Terrible
Outstanding
-10
0
10
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

23) How fair is the am ount recording artists earn?
Very undeserved
-10
0

Very deserved
10

I-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1

24) How w ould you rate your attitude towards the recording industry?
H ighly unfavorable
Highly favorable
-10
0
10

I-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1

25) N o one is harm ed w hen people copy music.
Strongly Disagree
-10
0

Strongly Agree
10

I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

26) The fact that m any other people download music for free m akes it ok for me to do it.
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
-10
0
10
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

27) R ecently some people have been prosecuted for copying music without permission.
W hat is your opinion about them being prosecuted?
Strongly D isagree
Strongly Agree
-10
0
10
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
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28) A cquiring individual songs o f choice is better than acquiring a full album/CD.
Strongly D isagree
Strongly Agree
-10
0
10
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

29) There could be risks such as bad quality or a virus from downloading unpaid music.
How do you perceive such risks?
None
Great
0
10
I----------------------------1----------------------------1

30) If you illegally attained m usic, what is your chance o f getting caught?
None
0
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - -

Great
10
1

31) I f you should steal m usic and got caught, how severe do you think your penalty
w ould be?
None
Great
0
10
I----------------------------1----------------------------1
32) How ethical is it to copy music without perm ission?
Unethical
-10
0
I---------------------------- 1-----------------------------1---------------

Completely Ethical
10
4-----------------------------1

33) Do you have a m ajor credit card/debit (e.g. M aster Card, Visa)?
Yes
No
34) How com fortable are you using the card to m ake on-line purchases?
Very U ncom fortable
Completely Comfortable
-10
0
10

I------------------------ 1------------------------ 1------------------------ 1------------------------ 1

35)

W hat is your age?
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36) W hat is your gender?
M ale
Fem ale
37 ) _____________ Y ears o f formal education (e.g. 1 year college = 1 3 years)?
38) W hat is your household incom e?
Less than $25,000
$25,000 - $50,000
M ore than $50,000
39 ) _____ N um ber o f people in your household
40) Do you rent or own your dwelling?
Rent
Ow n
41 )

Interviewer Nam e

42 ) ____________N eighborhood Num ber
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Appendix B
VARIABLE SOURCES
This appendix discusses the source o f the variables m easured for each model in
the same order the m odels are presented in the text. First, recall that the Becker model
includes the following variables: Caught, Penalty, Age, Gender, Edu, Lowinc, Medinc,
House, and Rent.

Every data point used for the analysis presented here comes from

individual responses to specific questions on the questionnaire.
Caught

= question 30

Penalty = question 31
Age

= question 35

G ender = question 36
Edu

= question 37

Lowinc = question 38
M edinc = question 39
House

= question 40

The Theory o f Reasoned Action requires som e calculation for the variables as
they are created using several different questions. Recall that variables necessary to test
this m odel are Attitude and Norms. A ttitude was calculated by taking an average o f the
individual’s beliefs about the music industry (question 24) and music artists (question
23). The result is believed to capture the individual’s feelings toward the people or firms
76
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harm ed by theft. This result is added to the individuals personally held beliefs about the
legitim acy o f m usic theft, believed to be captured by the average o f three factors: (1)
W hether they believe music theft causes harm to other (question 25), (2) their belief
regarding the fairness o f being prosecuted (question 27), and (3) the personal ethical
belief o f the individual towards theft (question 32). The follow ing form ula shows how
attitude was computed:
Attitude = 1/2 (question 23 + question24) +
l/3((question25*-l) + (question!?) + (question32)*-l)
This form ula produces a num ber in the range o f -20 to 20.

Question 25 and 32 are

m ultiplied by negative one for proper scaling (e.g., so negative 20 represents the most
perm issive attitude toward theft).
The variable Norm s is also m ultiplied by a negative one. Thus, the sm aller the
response the m ore likely the individual is to steal. Norm s comes from the respondent’s
answer to question 26 only.
The augmented Becker m odel uses the same variables as the Becker model and
the Theory o f Reasoned Action. No changes are m ade in their computation from the
description above.
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